including personal injury, premises liability and wrongful death
defense, business and commercial litigation, and employment law.
He also defends clients from claims arising under Texas' workers'
compensation laws, the Federal Employer Liability Act, the Jones Act,
the Longshore Act (and its extensions), and other land transportation
and maritime personal injury claims.
2001 Bryan Street, Suite 4000
Dallas, Texas 75201
214.572.2254 Phone
214.748.4530 Fax
aschreck@downsstanford.com
www.downsstanford.com
waterways often face exposures under
the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act (LHWCA) and the
Jones Act. This article provides a brief
review of recent federal cases affecting
jurisdiction under these laws.
Supreme Court had finally answered
this question in Stewart v. Dutra
Construction Company, 543 U.S. 481.
Dutra's dredge SUPER SCOOP is a
floating platform. It removes silt from
the ocean floor and dumps it into
adjacent scows (small barges). Stewart
was injured and sued Dutra claiming
he was a seaman. The dispositive issue
was whether the dredge was a vessel.
The court defined a "vessel" as "every
description of watercraft or other
artificial contrivance used, or capable of
being used, as a means of transportation
on water." Although the dredge's primary
purpose was not navigation or maritime
dredge was a vessel because it was
"capable of being used as means of
transportation on water."
This year, the Court decided Lozman
v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida, 133
S.Ct. 735 (2013). Lozman's floating home
was a plywood house-shaped structure,
stored at a marina owned by the City
of Riviera Beach. The City filed suit
seeking dockage fees. Lozman moved to
dismiss for lack of admiralty jurisdiction.
The district court found the structure to
be a vessel. The 11
it was "capable of moving over the water"
despite Lozman's subjective intent
to have the structure remain moored
indefinitely. Lozman appeared to move
away from the Stewart test, reasoning
that a contrivance or watercraft may be
a vessel when a "reasonable observer
looking at its physical characteristics
and activities could conclude that it
was designed to any practical degree for
carrying people or things on water."
status is obvious. Outlier cases,
including structures used in the offshore
energy industry, will create challenges
under the Dutra and Lozman tests for
vessel status. In Mendez v. Anadarko
Petroleum Corporation, 2012 U.S. App.
LEXIS 6405 (5
claims, ruling the spar structure Mendez
was working on was not a "vessel."
The spar, RED HAWK, was a floating
gas production platform moored 5,000
feet in ocean water, 210 miles from
Sabine Pass, Texas. Since 2004, it was
secured to the ocean floor by six anchor
moorings.
Under the Jones Act, a plaintiff
must first establish that he has a
"connection to a vessel in navigation (or
an identifiable group of such vessels) ..."
The court noted from Stewart that
"a watercraft is not capable of being
used for maritime transport in any
meaningful sense if it had been
permanently moored or otherwise
rendered practically incapable of
transportation or movement," and
held the RED HAWK was not a vessel
because it was permanently moored.
Moving the spar would take two months,
involve detaching all moorings, severing
In Employer Liability Claims